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10 September 1953

Mr. James Q. Reber
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Reber:

Reference is made to your letter marked for my attention, dated 4 September 1953, concerning completed research products of [redacted]

[redacted] In view of the need for comments concerning these studies on a "crash" basis, my personal comments are submitted on an informal basis. These views are governed in part by previous reactions secured from other staff agencies of the Department of the Army. Every effort will be made to forward any additional comments which may be secured through our appropriate channels. It is understood that you have previously received comments from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Of the major studies produced [redacted] to date, this Office has received only the first one listed; namely, Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union and in its European Satellites to Political Warfare (5 volumes). The other three studies mentioned in your letter have not yet been received but three copies each would be of use to this Office. If this can be arranged, copies should be forwarded to: Chief, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, marked for my attention.

When the five-volume study mentioned above was received, it was circulated within this Office for information. By separate action the Chief of Staff of the Army also received a copy which in turn was forwarded to the Chief, Psychological Warfare with the directive that it be reviewed and studied so as to determine its usefulness for Army planning and policy guidance. Generally speaking, the reaction to this study was as follows:

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a. The information contained therein was slanted toward the highest government levels, such as the White House, State Department, Psychological Strategy Board, et cetera, and therefore was of less value to Army staff agencies. The information contained in the five volumes is excellent as background information and therefore could be used as supporting material for appropriate plans which might be under consideration.

b. One or two individual comments were to the effect that: "The study contains much useful material and some brilliantly written essays but does not appear to be the type of work which can be considered a completed staff study or an authoritative statement of the problem. The conclusions and recommendations may or may not prove correct, but they are not justified by the scope and volume of data presented."

c. It should be stated in fairness to the study that if and when the recommendations made in the study are adopted by the highest political authority and then enunciated formally as national policy, then the arguments which support the recommendations as made will serve as rich source material for the Psychological Warfare planner and operator. At that time, the study would offer these staff officers lines of reasoning which could be employed in the task of explaining to enemy and friendly audiences the motivation of our policy. On the other hand, if the recommendations are not adopted as national policy, then the material presented in the form of arguments for the recommendations would be of little use.

d. The information given on such subjects as the stresses in Soviet society, the attitudes and dissatisfactions of various classes of Soviet citizens, the points of psychological weakness among Soviet military personnel, et cetera are excellent as background material which is needed for Psychological Warfare handbooks. This type of information, of course, requires continuing review and revision in the light of new information as and when it is received.

I believe the above comments offer a partial answer to the four questions contained in your last paragraph. A sincere effort will be made to secure more objective answers to these questions and they will be forwarded to you at a later date.

C. D. LEATHERMAN
Chief, Research Branch

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